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1. Introduction: Crossed Wires? 
 
Adams and Aizawa, in a series of recent and forthcoming 
papers ((2001), (In Press), (This Volume)) seek to refute, or 
perhaps merely to terminally embarrass, the friends of the 
extended mind. One such paper begins with the following 
illustration: 
 
"Question: Why did the pencil think that 2+2=4? 
Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the    
mathematician" 
Adams and Aizawa (this volume) ms p.1 
 
"That" the authors continue "about sums up what is wrong 
with Clark's extended mind hypothesis". The example of the 
pencil, they suggest, is just an especially egregious version of 
a fallacy said to pervade the literature on the extended mind. 
This fallacy, which they usefully dub the "coupling-
constitution fallacy", is attributedi, in varying degrees and 
manners, to Van Gelder and Port (1995), Clark and Chalmers 
(1998), Haugeland (1998), Dennett (2000), Clark (2001), Gibbs 
(2001), and Wilson (2004). The fallacy, of course, is to move 
from the causal coupling of some object or process to some 
cognitive agent, to the conclusion that the object or process is 
part of the cognitive agent
ii
, or part of the agent's cognitive 
processing (see e.g. Adams and Aizawa (This volume) ms 
p.2). Proponents of the extended mind and related theses, 
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Adams and Aizawa repeatedly assert, are prone to this 
fallacy in part because they either ignore or fail to properly 
appreciate the importance of " the mark of the cognitive" viz 
the importance of an account of "what makes something a 
cognitive agent" (op cit ms p.3). The positive part of Adams 
and Aizawa's critique then emerges as a combination of the 
assertion that this "mark of the cognitive" involves the idea 
that "cognition is constituted by certain sorts of causal 
process that involve non-derived contents" (e.g. op cit ms 
p.3) and that these processes look to be characterized by 
psychological laws that turn out to apply to many internal 
goings-on but not currently (as a matter of contingent 
empirical fact) to any processes that take place in non-
biological tools and artifacts. 
 
In what follows, I shall try to show why these arguments 
display nothing so much as mutual failures of 
communication: crossed wires concealing a couple of real, 
important, but much more subterranean, disagreements. In 
particular, I try to show why the negative considerations 
advanced by Adams and Aizawa fail to successfully 
undermine the argument for the extended mind, and why 
their more radical positive story, unless supplemented by 
implausible additional claims, fails to cast doubt on the claim 
that minds like ours can (without the need for any radically 
new techniques, technologies or interventions) extend into 
the world. 
 
Before embarking on all this, a word about the intended 
force of the argument. Adams and Aizawa make much of 
their concession (see e.g. their (in press) ms p.1) that mental 
extension is possible, just not, they claim, actual. Theirs, they 
insist, is a 'contingent intercranialism' applicable to human 
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agents in the current state of technology. But they seem to 
imply that my own view (and that of Clark and Chalmers 
(1998), must, if it is to stand in contrast to this, be that such 
extension is rampant, and that "in ordinary tool use we have 
instances in which cognitive processes span the cranial 
boundary and extend into intercranial space" (op cit ms 
p.2)). Whatever the truth of such a claim (of rampant 
extension) it is not one made by the present author, nor by 
Clark and Chalmers (1998). Rather, that claim was that in  
imaginable circumstances, ones that involved no giant leaps of 
technology or technique, we would be justified in holding that 
certain mental and cognitive states extended (in a sense to be 
explained later) into the non-biological world. This leaves it 
open whether there are such extensions and (if there are) 
exactly how widespread they are. But it is still far stronger 
than the mere claim of 'logical possibility' that Adams and 
Aizawa suggest as the proper alternative to rampant actual 
extension. 
 
1. The Odd Coupling 
 
Consider the following exchange, loosely modeled on 
Adams and Aizawa's opening 'reductio': 
 
Question: Why did the V4 neuron think that there was 
a spiral pattern in the stimulus? 
 
Answer: Because it was coupled to the monkey. 
 
Now clearly, there is something wrong here. But the 
absurdity lies not in the appeal to coupling but in the idea 
that a V4 neuroniii (or even a group of V4 neurons, or even a 
whole parietal lobe…) might itself be some kind of self-
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contained locus of thinking. It is crazy to think that a V4 
neuron thinks, and it is (just as Adams and Aizawa imply) 
crazy to think that a pencil might think. Yet the thrust of 
Adams and Aizawa's rhetoric is, again and again, to draw 
attention to the evident absence of cognition in the putative 
part as a way of 'showing' that coupling (even when 
properly understood- see below) cannot play the kind of role 
it plays in the standard arguments for cognitive extension. 
Thus we read that: 
 
"When Clark makes an object cognitive when it is 
connected to a cognitive agent, he is committing an 
instance of a "coupling-constitution fallacy" 
Adams and Aizawa (this volume, ms p.2) my 
emphasis 
 
But this talk, of an objects being or failing to be 'cognitive' 
seems almost unintelligible when applied to some putative 
part of a cognitive agent or of a cognitive system. What 
would it mean for the neuron or the pencil to be, as it were, 
brute factively 'cognitive'? Nor, I think, is this merely an 
isolated stylistic infelicity on the part of Adams and Aizawa. 
For the same issue arose many times during personal 
exchangesiv concerning the vexed case of Otto and his 
notebook (the example used, with, importantly, a great 
many riders and qualifications, in Clark and Chalmers 
(1998)). And it arises again and again, as we shall later see, in 
various parts of their more recent challenges concerning 'the 
mark of the cognitive' 
 
Let us first be clear then about the precise role of the appeal 
to coupling in the arguments for the extended mind. The 
appeal to coupling is not intended to make any external 
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object 'cognitive' (insofar as this notion is even intelligible). 
Rather, it is intended to make some object, that in and of 
itself is not usefully (perhaps not even intelligibly) thought 
of as either cognitive or non-cognitive, into a proper part of some 
cognitive routine. It is intended, that is to say, to ensure that 
the putative part is poised to play the kind of role that itself 
ensures its status as part of the agent's cognitive routines. 
 
Now, it is certainly true (and this, I think, is one important 
fact to which Adams and Aizawa's argument might 
conceivably draw the reader's attention) that not just any old 
kind of coupling will achieve even this result. But probably 
no-one in the literature, and certainly not myself, nor Clark 
and Chalmers, ever claimed otherwise. Hence the presence 
of the conditions of (broadly speaking) 'glue and trust' 
pursued at length in Clark and Chalmers (1998), and briefly 
summarized in various other places, including the target 
papers by Adams and Aizawa. There is no need to repeat the 
conditions, even summarily, here, as the present focus is on 
the overall shape of the argument and on the issues 
concerning coupling and the mark of the cognitive, rather 
than on these aspects of the original content. But it is 
perhaps worth noting that the bulk of our (1998) treatment 
was devoted not to some general notion of coupling but to 
the isolation and defence of a very specific set of features.  
 
The biggest of the crossed wires in the exchange with Adams 
and Aizawa concerns, I think, the role of those features. For 
Adams and Aizawa often fail to fully appreciate that the 
conditions (of 'glue and trust') speak to the question (which 
we deemed fully intelligible) 'when is some physical object 
or process acting as part of a larger cognitive routine?' and 
not to the much murkier (probably unintelligible) question 
 6 
'when should we say, of some such candidate part, that it is 
itself cognitive?'. The question at issue then, was what kind 
of coupling makes for incorporation into a cognitive system 
rather than simply and mundanely use by a cognitive 
system? 
 
In outlining an answer, we (Clark and Chalmers) chose to be 
guided by a set of intuitions derived from reflection on the 
ordinary use of talk of non-occurrent, dispositional beliefs. 
In essence, we took these intuitions and systematically 
showed that the kind of functional poise (poise to guide 
various forms of behaviour) associated with such 
dispositional believings on the part of Otto, a previously 
identified cognitive agent might sometimes be partially 
supported by a highly non-standard physical realization in 
which a notebook (for example) acted as the physical 
medium of long-term storage. The right kind of coupling to 
make the external resource into a part of the cognitive 
system, we argued, was one that poised the information 
contained in the notebook for sufficiently easy, reliable and 
automatic 'use' (deployment would be a better word) in 
much the same way as is typically (though not always) 
achieved by biological encoding.  
 
Clark and Chalmers thus offered an argument (which one 
may accept or reject: that is, of course, another matter) 
concerning conditions not of 'being cognitive' but for 
incorporation as part of the physical substrate of a cognitive 
system. In so doing we were not even close, as far as we can 
see, to committing any simple coupling-constitution fallacy. 
 
We must be cautious, however, for Adams and Aizawa are 
nonetheless aware that the conclusion we were aiming for is 
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that the object or process be part of the agent's cognitive 
apparatus (see e.g. Adams and Aizawa (this volume) ms 
p.2). The misunderstanding is thus more complex, and 
ultimately more interesting, than any simple failure to 
identify the correct target. The deeper, and more interesting, 
point is that Adams and Aizawa seem to think that some 
objects or processes, in virtue of their own nature (see section 2 
below) are, as I shall now put it, candidate parts (for inclusion 
in a cognitive process). Whereas other objects or processes, 
still in virtue of their own nature, are not. This, I think, must 
be the way to give sense to that otherwise baffling question 
"is some X cognitive?" when asked of some putative part. 
This then is the link between the skirmish concerning a 
putative coupling-constitution fallacy and their subsequent 
positive story concerning the 'mark of the cognitive'. Thus 
the authors ask: 
 
"..if the fact that an object or process X is coupled to a 
cognitive agent does not entail that X is part of the 
cognitive agent's cognitive apparatus, what does? The 
nature of X of course. One needs a theory of what makes 
a process a cognitive process. One needs a theory of the 
"mark of the cognitive"." 
 
Adams and Aizawa (this volume) ms p.3. (My italics). 
 
It is to this (vexed and vexing) issue that I now turn. 
 
 




So, let's try this again. Maybe Adams and Aizawa's idea is 
that that V4 neuron is, in some intelligible sense, 'cognitive'? 
Maybe it is cognitive in the sense just identified above: the 
sense of being, in virtue of its own nature, at least a candidate 
for being or becoming a proper part of a genuinely cognitive 
process. Such, I am at least tempted to think, has to be the 
underlying belief driving much of Adams and Aizawa's 
otherwise rather mystifying critique. This puzzling 
possibility brings us to the more positive part of Adams and 
Aizawa's discussion viz their enthusiastic appeal to the idea 
of the 'mark of the cognitive'.   
 
Notice first that this way of reconstructing the debate, if 
correct, already suggests a major concession to the role of 
coupling. For assume we find some such acceptable ('in 
virtue of its own nature') candidate part. Then what settles 
the question whether that part belongs to this cognitive 
system, or to that one, or (currently) to no cognitive system 
at all? It is hard to see just what, apart from appeal to some 
kind of coupling (perhaps along with some insufficient but 
broadly historical considerations), could motivate an answer 
to this subsequent question. 
 
But put that aside. Let's stick, just as Adams and Aizawa 
insist we should, to the topic of the 'mark of the cognitive'. 
What could it be that, as they put it "makes a process a 
cognitive process" ((this volume) ms p.3)? The question is 
non-trivial, and has, as Adams and Aizawa (somewhat 
reluctantly) admit, no well-established answer within 
cognitive science or philosophy of mind. Nonetheless, they 
tie their colours to what they depict as "a rather orthodox 
theory of the nature of the cognitive" (Adams and Aizawa 
(2001) p.52. According to this theory (op cit p.53) "cognition 
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involves particular kinds of processes involving non-derived 
representations". This is the line also pursued in Adams and 
Aizawa (this volume) and  (forthcoming). It comprises two 
distinct elements, just as presented in the quote viz an 
appeal to non-derived content and an appeal to "particular 
kinds of process".  
 
Despite its prominence in their account, Adams and Aizawa 
really tell us very little about what the first of these (non-
derived content) might amount to. We learn that it is content 
that is in some sense intrinsic ((2001) p. 48). We learn that 
this is to be contrasted with, for example, the way a public 
language symbol gets its content by 'conventional 
association' (op cit). We are told, in the same place, that 
Dretske, Fodor, Millikan and others are (sometimes) in 
search of an adequate theory of such content, and that the 
combination of a language of thought with some kind of 
causal/historical account is a hot contender for such an 
account. Towards the end of all this, however, the authors 
make a concession which, I elsewhere argue (Clark (this 
volume)) takes much of the sting out of the tail of the appeal 
to non-derived content. This is the concession that: 
 
“Having argued that, in general, there must be non-
derived content in cognitive processes, it must be 
admitted that it is unclear to what extent every 
cognitive state of each cognitive process must involve 
non-derived content”  
Adams and Aizawa (2001) p.50. 
 
As I (wrongly- see below) understood it, this concession 
allowed that an external resource, none of whose states or 
processes or stored representations were themselves 
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intrinsically contentful (assuming we are able to make sense 
of that notion in some way) might nonetheless be a proper 
part of some genuinely cognitive process. Otto's notebook, 
then, to take the obvious example, might be just such a 
resource, since it is full of inscriptions written in (let's 
assume) English. Yet Otto's notebook, in the light of this 
concession, might still figure as part of the supervenience 
base for some of Otto's dispositional beliefs even while 
failing itself to be a repository of states with intrinsic 
content. 
 
Of course, we do not have to think of Otto's notebook this 
way. A more radical response would be to argue that what 
makes any symbol or representation (internal or external) 
mean what it does is just something about its behaviour-
supporting role (and maybe its causal history) within some 
larger system. We might then hold that when we understand 
enough about that role (and, perhaps, history) we will see 
that the encodings in Otto's notebook are in fact on a par 
with those in his biological memory. In other words, just 
because the symbols in the notebook happen to look like 
words of English, and require some degree of interpretative 
activity when retrieved and used, that need not rule out the 
possibility that they have also come to satisfy the demands 
on being, given their role within the larger system, among 
the physical vehicles of various forms of intrinsic content.  
 
Be that as it may, there is something quite compelling, I 
want to admit, about the idea that the notebook encodings 
are all conventional and derivative, and also about the 
thought that some parts of any genuinely cognitive system need 
to trade in representations that are not thus conventional and 
derivative. To accept this, however, is not to give up on the 
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extended mind claim for Otto, unless one also accepts (what 
seems to me to be an independent and far less plausible 
assertion) that no proper part of a properly cognitive system can 
afford, at any time, to trade solely in conventional representations. 
It was this additional claim that, I thought, was being 
explicitly rejected (and, I felt, quite rightly so) in the above 
quoted passage from Adams and Aizawa. No surprise, then, 
that I thought the concession undermined their own 
argument! 
 
It seems, however, that I was wrong and that Adams and 
Aizawa do in fact endorse something like this additional 
(and I think implausible) claim. Thus  (this volume, ms p.5) 
the authors accuse me of not seriously attempting to 
understand the point of their actual concession, and hence of 
(incorrectly) taking it as rendering the appeal to non-derived 
content argumentatively vacuous, at least in the case of the 
debate concerning extended cognition. Mea culpa. 
 
So what went wrong? The original concession was followed 
by an example to which I paid insufficient attention. The 
example involved possible non-representational elements in 
a language of thought encoding, such as 'punctuation marks' 
and 'parentheses' (see their (2001) p. 50). Such potential 
elements, they concede, need not count as 'intrinsic 
representations' or even as content-bearing, yet they would still 
be proper parts of a properly cognitive process. I confess that 
I simply did not (and still do not) understand this suggestion 
regarding a Language of Thought encoding  (it is repeated in 
their (this volume) ms p 4-5, without appearing to me to be 
any clearer). Nonetheless, it is now clear that whatever it 
may mean, it was not intended to concede the possibility 
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concerning Otto's notebook that I scouted above. For the 
authors now clarify their original claim thus: 
 
"Clearly, we mean that if you have a process that 
involves no intrinsic content, then the [intrinsic content] 
condition rules that the process is non-cognitive"  
Adams and Aizawa (this volume) ms p.5). 
My emphasis. 
 
As I now understand it then, their position regarding the 
role of intrinsic content is this: that there may be a process 
that is a genuinely cognitive process that has as a proper 
part, some goings-on (such as, presumably, the tokening of 
the punctuation mark in the LOT, puzzling as this still 
sounds to me) that themselves do not themselves involve 
intrinsic, non-derived contents (presumably because those 
parts-of-the-part now do not involve contents at all).  But 
such a process (the part, not the part-of-a-part!) must still 
involve at least some intrinsic content on pain of failing to be 
genuinely 'cognitive'. And Otto's notebook (I presume they 
must then wish to assert) fails even this very slightly 
weakened test as here (they think) we have a process that 
involves no intrinsic content at all. 
 
But in what sense do we, in the case of Otto's notebook, 
confront a process that involves no intrinsic content at all?  It 
helps to be careful about timing here. The time at which the 
notebook looks most clearly to be part of some real process is 
during the retrieval and use phase, and at that point in time, 
there are clearly plenty of states in play, in the larger 
notebook-including system, that count as intrinsically 
contentful, even on the Adams and Aizawa model. At 
runtime, the process is not one that trades solely in 
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representations whose contents are derived or 
conventionally determined. Instead, it is a hybrid process 
involving a variety of different kinds of representational 
element, some having derived contents, others not. 
 
What about at other times? Well, at such other times the 
claim is just that the notebook is part of the supervenience 
base for some of Otto's dispositional beliefs. What demands 
does this make on process? It is very hard to say. Perhaps we 
can at least say this: the very notion of a dispositional belief 
already makes implicit reference to what would happen in 
possible run-time situations. So there is here implicit reference 
to everything that those run-time processes would involve. 
The poise of the encodings in the notebook is such that, in 
the appropriate whole-system runtime circumstances, those 
encodings participate in extended processes that involve 
(let’s assume) states with intrinsic contents. It is this 
functional poise that matters, and that (we claimed) fits the 
notebook to become part of the physical supervenience base 
for some of Otto's dispositional beliefs. 
 
But suppose, Adams and Aizawa may insist, we put all that 
'implicit involvement of runtime process' talk aside and look 
solely at the (putative) part itself. Surely here we find a 
resource all of whose contentful states are derived, and 
doesn't that contravene the requirement concerning intrinsic 
content? In Clark (2003) and (2005), I offered a thought 
experiment meant to show that Adams and Aizawa's 
requirement, as applied to some storage resource considered 
out of the context of its runtime role in a larger system, was too 
strong and ought to be rejected. The thought experiment 
concerned beings ('Martians') endowed with an extra 
biological routine that allowed them to store bit-mapped 
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images of important chunks of visually encountered text. 
Later on, at will, they could access (and then interpret) this 
stored text. Surely, I argued, we would have no hesitation in 
embracing that kind of bit-mapped storage, even prior to an 
act of retrieval, as part and parcel of the Martian cognitive 
equipment. But what is stored is just a bit-mapped image of 
a fully conventional form of external representation. If we 
accept the Martian memory into the cognitive fold, surely 
only skin-and-skull based prejudice stops us extending the 
same courtesy to Otto. 
 
Despite spending time on what I presented as a preliminary 
(weaker and more complex) example (the one involving 
reasoning with imagined Venn Diagrams/ Euler Circlesv), 
Adams and Aizawa (this volume) do not comment on this 
casevi. Yet it raises, I still believe, at least some of the right 
issues. Even if we demand the involvement, in any cognitive 
process, of at least some items that bear their contents 
intrinsically, it is quite unclear how we should distribute this 
requirement across time and space. The Martian encodings 
are poised, here and now, to participate in processes that 
invoke intrinsic contents. So are those in Otto's notebook. 
Since it is arguably poise that matters, at least where 
dispositional believing is concerned, it seems that any 
reasonably plausible form of the requirement involving 
intrinsic content can, with a little imagination, be met. 
 
The notebook, I am happy to concede, is not, considered all 
on its own (and as far as I understand this notion at all) 
'intrinsically cognitive'. But it is a resource whose encodings, 
at appropriate run-time moments, inform Otto's behaviour 
in the way characteristic (Clark and Chalmers claimed) of 
dispositional beliefs. And this is all that matters. Perhaps it is 
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indeed essential that any truly cognitive activity (and hence 
any genuinely cognitive agent) draw on at least some states 
with intrinsic content. But we have been given no reason at 
all to accept the further (and crucial) claim that no proper part 
of such a properly cognitive system, considered now in 
splendid isolation from those crucial runtime wholes in 
which it participates, can afford to contain only 
representations lacking intrinsic content. Indeed, I see no 
reason why we should accept (or even be tempted by) such a 
further condition. Thus suppose (to take a very different 
example) that we think that any genuinely moral agent must 
be able to reason about the good of others. Still, we should 
not think that every proper part of such an agent (not even 
every proper part essential to their moral reasoning) must be 
capable of so doing. Just so, from the requirement (if it is a 
requirement) that every truly cognitive agent trade in states 
with intrinsic contents, it cannot follow that every proper 
part of the cognitive system of such an agent must so trade. 
 
This, to be sure, cuts both ways. As Adams and Aizawa 
point out in their (forthcoming, ms p.13) "it does not follow 
from the fact that one has an 'X system' that every 
component of the system does X". Consider, they suggest, a 
sound system: 
 
"Not every component produces sounds. The speakers 
do, but lasers in CD players, amplifiers, volume 
controls and tone controls do not. Again, not every 
component of an X system does X"  




But this goes no way at all towards demonstrating what 
Adams and Aizawa intend. Agreed, the mere fact that the 
notebook and bio-Otto 'form a system' establishes nothing. 
Perhaps Otto also forms some kind of a system with his 
garden tools, but that does not make the garden tools part of 
Otto. But the way to then proceed is surely not by asking, of 
the candidate part, does it somehow 'possess' the 
characteristic that we now want to ascribe to the resultant 
overall system. What the example of the sound systems 
shows, yet again, is simply the surprising extent to which 
Adams and Aizawa are committed to the usefulness of 
pressing a question that looks pretty clearly to be among the 
reddest of all possible herrings. That is the question whether 
Otto's notebook is (to put the matter bluntly) 'cognitive'. 
Since what is at issue is (to repeat) whether the notebook 
might now be part of the local supervenience base for some 
of Otto's dispositional beliefs  (a putative systems-level fact 
if ever there was one) the status of the notebook itself, as 
'cognitive' or 'non-cognitive' is (to whatever extent that idea 
is even intelligible) simply irrelevant. By contrast, the precise 
nature of the coupling between the notebook and the rest of 
the Otto system, and the kinds of behaviour and skilled 
interaction supported by that larger coupled whole, now 




3. That Cognitive Kind 
 
Consider now the other major part of Adams and Aizawa's 
challenge. Recall that their suggestion, concerning the 'mark 
of the cognitive' was that "cognition involves particular 
kinds of processes involving non-derived representations" 
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(Adams and Aizawa (2001) p.53). We have, I think, now said 
all that needs to be said concerning the appeal to non-
derived representation. But what about the other part of the 
clause, the appeal to "particular kinds of process" involving 
such representations. It is at this point that a new kind of 
consideration comes into play. This concerns the possible 
existence of a characteristic set of causal processes found, by 
painstaking empirical investigation, to pervade the internal, 
biologically-supported aspects of human cognitive 
architecture. The operation of these signature causal 
processes, the authors claim, give rise to a number of laws 
and regularities that seem to apply to (these known) 
cognitive processes, but that do not apply elsewhere (for 
example, to Otto's notebook). In the light of this, Adams and 
Aizawa ask, shouldn't we judge that the notebook falls 
outside the class of the cognitive? We should indeed do so, 
they claim, because "the cognitive must be discriminated on 
the basis of underlying causal processes" (Adams and 
Aizawa (2001) p. 52). Here too, then, we must unfortunately 
grapple with the murky appeal to some kind of apparently 
self-standing (i.e. non-systemic) notion of "the cognitive". 
Only this time the notion is linked to the specific laws and 
regularities characteristic of the internal, biological routines 
running in (earthly) cognitive agents. 
 
 
The kinds of law and regularity the authors have in mind 
here include the pervasiveness, in human (biological) 
memory systems of effects of chunking, priming, recency etc 
(Adams and Aizawa (2001) p. 61) and in human perceptual 
systems of various psychophysical laws (such as Weber's 
law, op cit). Given that science has uncovered these 
(undeniably important and interesting) regularities, what 
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does this imply concerning the nature of cognition? 
According to Adams and Aizawa, the proper conclusion is 
that: 
 
"the weight of empirical evidence supports the view 
that, as a matter of empirical fact, there are processes 
that are (a) recognizably cognitive, (b) take place in the 
brain, (c) do not take place outside of the brain and (d) 
do not cross from the brain into the external world" 
Adams and Aizawa (this volume) ms p.4 
 
Quite so. Or rather, quite so up until (d) where we again 
confront the thorny issue of processes, parts and the 
requirements upon parts. For while specific neural processes 
and their characteristic properties clearly do not cross over 
into the non-biological world, there may exist (according to 
friends of the extended mind) overarching processes that 
include (some of the) neural ones and some non-neural  ones, 
and that play the right kind of role in guiding and enabling 
behaviour to count as part of the physical base for cognition. 
 
Thus recall that opening salvo concerning the 
mathematician's pencil. The very next sentence read: 
 
"Clark apparently thinks that the nature of the 
processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell 
phone, piece of string or whatever, has nothing to do 
with whether that thing carries out cognitive 
processing" 
Adams and Aizawa (this volume) ms p.1 
 
It is now clearer what is at stake. Adams and Aizawa think 
that empirical investigations have turned up a number of 
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features (e.g. priming effects in the case of memory) that 
reflect the operation, in some parts of the physical universe, 
of processes internal to those parts. Since these parts support 
our paradigm cases of terrestrial cognition, we should 
believe (defeasibly, but justifiably on the basis of current 
evidence) that these kinds of causal process are essential to 
the cognitive status (again, just try hard to understand 
something by this notion) of such parts. It is the nature of the 
processes internal to the part that, so the argument goes, must 
determine whether it meets the conditions for inclusion into 
the ranks of the cognitive. 
 
But this is something the extended mind theorist might very 
reasonably deny. It seems very plausible, for example, that 
there is no part of the physical universe so devoid of 
potentially computationally useful properties that that part 
could not, under some conceivable circumstances, 
participate as a crucial element in some recognizably 
computational process upon which some cognitive state of 
some being supervenes. Whether a candidate part has the 
'right nature' seems, in such cases, to have much more to do 
with the rest of the system (and what it can and can't do in 
the absence of that part) than with any intrinsic properties of 
the part itself. 
 
Perhaps Adams and Aizawa will press the question, How do 
we know the state, in the scenario above, to be cognitive? On 
their account, we do so (at least in part) by asking to what 
extent it shares in the casual processes so far identified as 
characteristic of terrestrial biological cognition. But they 
surely cannot hold this as a general model of 'cognition-
spotting' since it rules out the discovery of new signature 
processes, even of the internal, earth-bound, biological kind. 
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Nor, I would have thought, can they hold that what goes for 
internal, biological, earth-bound cognition need be true of 
cognition tout court. The notion of the cognitive is surely 
bigger than that. If that special bit-mapped Martian memory, 
or even the whole of Martian memory, does not exhibit 
priming and recency effects, should we conclude that it is 
not memory at all or just that Martian remembering (I 




But what, Adams and Aizawa will by now be shouting in 
frustration, makes a process cognitive? I haven't said. What 
makes a process cognitive, it seems to me, is that it supports 
genuinely intelligent behaviour. This is obviously unhelpful, 
though it is almost certainly  the kind of reply that would be 
given by, say, the average neuroscientist or cognitive 
psychologist. Surely no psychologist or neuroscientist would 
instead assert, for example, that what makes some candidate 
process cognitive is that it exhibits effects of recency and 
priming! To identify cognitive processes as those processes, 
however many and varied, that support intelligent 
behaviour may be the best we can do. To argue from the 
other direction, and to identify cognitive processes as those 
that happen to characterize the neural activity of human 
agents, is to risk both an unwarranted narrowing of focus (to 
the neural) and a dangerous and unappealing chauvinism to 
boot.  
 
One (though certainly not the only) alternative is, to 
paraphrase Dennett, that cognition is as cognition does. That 
is to say, we might individuate the cognitivevii by its 
characteristic effects, not by its characteristic causes. The 
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notion of a cognitive process, if that were correct, might be 
best unpacked as the notion of a process that supports 
certain kinds of behaviour. Such a notion easily allows Otto's 
notebook, in virtue of its gross behavioral effects, to count as 
part of the local supervenience base for Otto's cognizings, 
and, more specifically, for some of his dispositional 
believings. Adams and Aizawa (2001, p.56) reject such a 
move as mere behaviorism. But -and this is surely crucial- in 
between these two extremes (appeal to sameness of gross 
behavioral effects and appeal to fine-grained sameness of 
information-processing profile) lie a world of possibilities. 
Where the ascription of dispositional belief is concerned, it 
might reasonably be argued, what counts is (amongst other 
things) the way information is poised to guide reasoning 
and behavior. This may include the drawing of inferences 
that never result, and perhaps never could resultviii, in overt 
actions. And this, by most standards at least, is not 
behaviorism but merely a somewhat coarse-grained kind of 
functionalism (for some more discussion, see Clark (this 
volume) section 2). 
 
We are now circling what may be the intractable nub of the 
problem. For Adams and Aizawaix are mightily impressed 
by the clear differences that exist between many of the 
goings-on found (so far) inside the bounds of skin and skull 
and the kinds of goings-on found in artifacts such as 
notebooks. And they invite us, repeatedly, to focus our 
attention on the nature of the notebook (to stick with that tired 
example) and thus hope to persuade us that it is 'not 
cognitive', that it fails to partake of the 'mark of the 
cognitive' and so on. That such differences (between, lets 
say, the notebook and the neo-cortex) exist, no-one should 
deny. But some of us are equally impressed by our apparent 
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capacity to form extended computational systems that 
profoundly factor in both sets of distinctive contributions, 
creating hybrid wholes that look to support brand new 
kinds of cognitive capacities. In the case of Otto, the new 
capacity is just a coarse functional simulacrum of his 
damaged biological memory capacity. In other cases, the 
new capacities might be more genuinely novel. But what 
matters, in every instance, is (1) the degree of 
complementarity (between the different contributions) and 
(2) the degree of agent-appropriate integration achieved. 
Given sufficient complementarity and integration, it 
becomes plausible (I argue) to treat the resultant system as a 
cognitive whole, with cognitive properties that supervene on 
more than the biological components alone. The extended 
mind is thus a kind of extended functionalism. Or rather, it 
is a form of normal ('unextended') functionalism taken to its 
logical conclusion. 
 
As a brief aside, I tend to believe, though nothing in the 
argument for the extended mind hangs upon  it, that large 
chunks of the internal, biological processing that goes on in 
us humans (though not in other animals) consists not in the 
manipulation of items bearing intrinsic content but in the 
manipulation of a variety of pointers, symbols and markers 
inherited rather directly from public language itself. These 
would be image-like neural encodings of public language 
words and symbols able to act, within the inner realm itself, 
in many of the same ways as external public language 
encodings act on, and empower, us. As a result, I believe 
that the kind of functional complementarity that, on the 
extended mind model, explains the power of integrated 
systems of internal and external resources also explains 
much of the apparently unique power of purely internal 
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human cognition. For more on this idea, see Clark (1998) (in 
press-a). 
 
Returning to the main matter of complementary internal and 
external (non-biological) resources, it is important to notice 
that attention to larger systemic wholes in no way precludes 
a proper investigation of the special features of various 
parts, aspects, and components. A useful partial comparison 
is with the move towards systems-level neurosciencex. For 
much of the century, most serious neuroscientific knowledge 
concerned the responses and behaviors of single cells. Then, 
with the advent of new techniques of recording, intervention 
and investigation, attention began to be devoted to 
understanding the neural dynamics of whole populations of 
cells, and the distinctive processing styles of different gross 
anatomical elements (such as the hippocampus). 
Contemporary neuroscience, courtesy of still-newer 
techniques of imaging and analysis, and by using 
increasingly bio-realistic neural network simulations, is just 
beginning to make progress in understanding some of the 
key features and properties of even larger-scale neural 
systems, whole processing cycles that involve the temporally 
evolving, often highly re-entrant, activity of multiple 
populations of neurons spanning a variety of brain areas. 
Note that the advent of true systems-level neuroscience will 
not (and should not) imply the inappropriateness of 
investigations that target the special properties and features 
of distinct cell-types or of distinct populations, or of distinct 
neural areas. But it must add to these investigations a new 
sensitivity to the added value created by processing cycles 
that include multiple complementary operations, performed 
at various time-scales and using various kinds of neural 
resource, and whose integrated action is responsible for 
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much of the power and scope of an individual human 
intelligence. 
 
The notion of the extended mind is thus really nothing more 
than the notion of systems-level cognitive (rather than 
neuro-) science. All it adds to that notion is some discussion, 
adverting to the details of bio/artifactual coupling, meant to 
make it plausible to treat some of these larger scale systems 
as the local supervenience base for the knowledge and 
cognitive capacities of a specific agent. This added wrinkle 
was not necessary in the move towards systems-level 
neuroscience as the old prejudices concerning the bounds of 
skin and skull there worked in favour of the 'obvious' 
appropriateness of that larger-scale investigation. 
 
But imagine a world (call it Hippo-world) in which for half a 
century, all neuroscientific attention was focused on the 
hippocampus, regarded (for some strange historical reason 
let's assume) as the obvious locus of human cognitive 
activity. Specific features of hippocampal processing and 
encoding are discovered and publicized. One day, a few 
researchers turn their attention to the rest of the brain. They 
discover many new and interesting features, and begin to 
talk about the larger processing circuits that link (for 
example) hippocampal and neo-cortical processing, and the 
way certain memory phenomena seem to depend on the 
complex interactions between the two components. But there 
is a problem. Some philosophers in Hippo-world believe 
that in discovering the characteristic causal processes that 
operate in the hippocampus, they were discovering the 
scientific essence of cognition itself. Better, they now insist, to 
view what the hippocampus does as cognitive and the rest of the 
brain as merely sending inputs to, or receiving outputs from, 
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that 'truly cognitive part'. Only the hippocampus, they 
suggest, exhibits the 'mark of the cognitive'. These other 
parts, after all, just don't do the same things as the 
hippocampus, so why regard what they do as cognitive?  
Others demur, for much of what they see as gross intelligent 
human behaviour seems to depend just as much upon the 
special features and properties of the other parts as upon the 
(important but limited) contribution of the hippocampus 
itself. Hippo-world begins a public debate on what they 
clumsily dub "the extended brain". The jury remains out. 
 
One important challenge, for those Hippo-worlders who 
want to treat the whole brain as a cognitive organ, concerns 
the question of 'added value'. What do we gain, they are 
asked, by challenging commonsense and starting to speak of 
extra-hippocampal activity as part of the physical base for 
cognition?  Can't we explain all that anyone actually does by 
treating what the hippocampus does as cognitive and the 
rest as (perhaps instrumentally useful but) non-cognitive? 
As long as we note what actually gets done, and are 
sensitive to how information flows through the whole 
system, this will work fine won't it? Isn't all we need, to 
paraphrase Rupert (2004) the 'hypothesis of the embedded 
hippocampus'? 
 
I think the answer to this question must be 'yes'. We could, if 
we so wished, carve up the contributions in the way 
suggested. And this may well have the advantage of not 
challenging commonsense (as it had apparently developed 
on Hippo-world). But by the same token, if we (standing, 
admittedly, on Earth, not Hippo-world!) accept the vision of 
the whole brain as a locus of processing cycles that include 
multiple complementary operations, performed using 
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various kinds of neural resource, and whose integrated 
action is responsible for much of the power and scope of an 
individual human intelligence, there is a clear case for 
accusing Hippo-world commonsense of displaying a 
needlessly restricted vision of cognitive processing. Yet the 
description just given works every bit as well for the case of 
the extended mind. There, the idea is that the brain-body-
world system is sometimes (when the right coupling 
conditions are met) the locus of processing cycles that 
include multiple complementary operations, performed 
using various kinds of neural resource, and whose 
integrated action is responsible for much of the power and 
scope of an individual human intelligence. 
 
The challenge of added-value thus cuts both ways. For what 
is the added value, one may ask, in not embracing these 
visions of larger systemic wholes? No-one, after all, is 
suggesting that such larger visions preclude investigation of 
the special features and properties of any of the parts. Just as 
systems-level neuroscience should not be seen as a threat to 
single-cell neursocience, or indeed to the study of the 
hippocampus, so systems-level cognitive science should not 
be seen as a threat to neuroscience or to the study of the 
special features and properties of the biological brain. In fact, 
one of those special features and properties, neural 
plasticity, is visibly crucial to the brain's astounding ability 
to enter into the most profound forms of cognitive 
extension
xi
 in the first place. 
 
 
4. Beneath the Surface 
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Perhaps we have now had enough of the cut and thrust of 
argument and counter-argument. More helpful, in the long 
run, would be a genuine attempt to see (and ideally to 
accommodate) what moves each side in this debate. 
Underlying Adams and Aizawa's critique of (the arguments 
for) extended cognition is, I suspect, a quite reasonable, 
though subtly misplaced, fear. It is the fear of undervaluing 
the cognitive core. The cognitive core, as I shall use the term, is 
the set of basic skills of perceiving and learning that we 
share with many other earthly animals. At the heart of this 
skill-set lie the rich abilities of subtle pattern-recognition that 
allow us to learn about important regularities in our 
environment by exposure to repeated exemplars. In 
combination with affective and motivational systems, this 
kind of potent, slow, pattern-based learning enables many 
animals, ourselves included, to learn to deal with highly 
complex situations in a remarkably nuanced and efficient 
manner.  
 
I suspect that the real fear underlying much opposition to 
the extended mind, and the explanation of the quite palpable 
unease it causes even in some of its most sensitive critics, is 
that by celebrating the power of new, hybrid, extended 
systems we lose sight of that crucial cognitive corexii. The fear 
would be that to embrace hybrid cognitive forms is to lose 
sight of the unique importance of the core systems upon 
whose successful operation the very possibility of such 
forms depends. But such fears are groundless. It is no part of 
the agenda of the extended mindxiii to attempt to wash out all 
the differences between various internal and external 
contributions, nor to downplay or undervalue the (currently) 
unique contribution of the cognitive core. Indeed, the actual 
research program of the extended mind is committed, above 
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all, to plotting and charting the varied contributions made 
by a variety of biological and non-biological resources, and 
the potent and multi-layered interactions between them. The 
agenda is thus  not a negative but a purely positive one: to 
understand the larger systemic webs that,  spun around the 
common core shared with so many other animals, help to 
give human cognition its distinctive power, character and 
charm.  
 
Consider, by way of partial analogy, the more mundane fact 
that human animals, apparently uniquely on the planet, 
display (in addition to the common core) a second, rather 
different set of skills. These are the skills of explicit, 
deliberative, 'language-infected' (see e.g. Dennett (1996)) 
reason and planning. Working together, these two very 
different sets of skills make us into especially potent 
cognitive engines. Nonetheless, if we contemplate these two 
kinds of cognitive resource, it seems  compelling that in 
some very important sense, it is the skills of basic pattern-
recognition, learning and affectively tuned response that are 
the most fundamental. By this I mean only that without 
these we would probably be unable to have thoughts at all, 
and, ipso facto, unable to have linguistically-infected 
thoughts. But notice that, even for the staunchest cognitive 
internalist,  it does not follow from this that those additional, 
linguistically-infected modes of thinking are not precisely 
that: modes of thinking. One can (and should) celebrate the 
power of explicit, deliberative, linguistically-infected 
thought without thereby undervaluing the (in one sense) 
more fundamental contribution of the cognitive core we 
share with non-linguistic animals. 
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This very same model (of an essential core with some mind-
bogglingly potent add-ons) can then be invoked by the 
friends of the extended mind. It is surely entirely likely that 
many of the kinds of extended cognitive system mooted in 
the literature on the extended mind are in just the same sense 
less fundamental. They are less fundamental in that no 
genuinely cognitive system could consist entirely of the most 
typical kinds of external resources
xiv
 that (currently) augment 
the common core. This, I think, is the important grain of 
truth underlying Adams and Aizawa's arguments 
concerning derived contents, conventional encodings, the 
'non-cognitive' status of notebooks, etc etc. It is a grain of 
truth, however, that is no more damaging to the vision of the 
extended mind than it is to the vision of the language-
infected mind. In each case, powerful new cognitive wholes 
are brought into being on the back of some set of more basic, 
and perhaps even cognitively indispensable, skills and 
capacities. And in each case, the new integrated systems that 
result are cognitive systems in their own right. They are, 
moreover, the cognitive systems whose operation accounts 
for many of the most unique and characteristic achievements 
of the human mind. 
 
 
Conclusions: Watering the Desert 
 
Adams and Aizawa's challenge to the extended mind is 
rather like a challenge that might be posed to a theorist of 
irrigation. Take some putative part of a process of irrigation 
and ask yourself, is that part irrigative? To push the question, 
demand of the theorist of irrigation an account of the 'mark 
of the irrigative' and then ask whether some putative part of 
some process of irrigation shares in that mark.  
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We should not, I think, like to approach the matter of an 
irrigation system in this way. What we want to know, of 
some putative proper part of such a system, is whether it 
contributes to the functional whole. We may ask ourselves, 
for example, whether it enables that functional whole to 
irrigate land that it could not otherwise reach. To the extent 
that the answer is positive, the part (ceteris paribus of 
course) looks to be part of the system of irrigation, 
regardless of whether water drizzles out of it. 
 
Just so, there is surely little long-term value in pursuing the 
question, asked of Otto's much-maligned notebook "is it 
cognitive"? Instead, we must attend (as Clark and Chalmers 
did attend) to the role of the notebook in the larger 
organization of which biological Otto is a part. Then we can 
ask questions such as, Does the notebook enable this larger 
system to exhibit the kinds of behavioral regularity 
characteristic of an individual's dispositionally believing that 
such-and-such? Such a move towards a larger systemic focus 
is familiar and sometimes helpful.  The study of the 
extended mind presents, I suggest, no greater theoretical or 
practical difficulties than those, significant as they were, that 
attended the move towards a systems-level neuroscience.  
And it is justified (or so I believe) in very much the same 
way. In each case, we confront densely integrated larger-
scale organizations that support some of the kinds of 
intelligent behaviour most characteristic of our species. 
Systems-level neuroscience, however, had one enormous 
advantage. It could for the most part simply help itself to the 
idea of an individual, sufficiently unified, cognizer. 
Extended mind theorists cannot. Instead, the incorporation 
of a non-biological resource into the cognitive processing of 
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an individual requires that certain kinds of coupling 
between biological and non-biological resources be present. 
Absent the right kinds of coupling, of course, and even inner 
biological going-on (replete, let's assume, with all the 
currently available 'marks of the cognitive') would not count 
as part of the cognitive activity of that very agent. When such 
couplings are in place, however, the bounds of skin and 
skull are rendered functionally irrelevant and cognition 
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i These attributions are all fully explicit, but are spread across the three papers 
((2001) (in press) (this volume)) mentioned at the start. 
 
ii The need for some kind of 'nontriviality clause' (to borrow a phrase from 
Rupert (this volume) is actually widely recognized in the literature on the 
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extended mind. If it were not, then arguments for the extended mind could have 
been very short indeed! The requirement is made explicit in, for example 
Wheeler and Clark (1999) p.110 
 
iii
 Thanks to Rob Wilson for the single-neuron comparison. 
 
iv Thus Ken Aizawa, after a long series of exchanges, asks "so, you really agree 
with us that the notebook is non-cognitive?'", as if an affirmative answer were 
incompatible with the extended mind thesis. Yet insofar as the question is even 
intelligible, we would indeed reply that the notebook, considered alone, is 'non-
cognitive', just like a neuron or group of neurons. 
 
v Adams and Aizawa (this volume) devote much space to arguing that the  case 
of the Euler Circles) fails to meet their condition, properly understood, and they 
are right to do so. I offered it only as a case where some proper aspects of a 
genuinely mental process seem to trade in representations whose meanings are 
conventional. This, after all, was how I saw the case of Otto's notebook (more on 
which in the text). 
 
vi In a personal communication, Ken Aizawa did offer a tentative response, on 
behalf of Adams and Aizawa as follows: 
 
"We aren’t sure what basis Clark has for saying that these bit-mapped 
images are part of the Martian cognitive economy, since we aren’t sure 
what he thinks is the mark of the cognitive.  Perhaps this is just Clark 
putting some of his intuitions on the table.  Be this as it may, we think it is 
perfectly reasonable for us to stand by the view that these Martian 
representational states are not cognitive states.  We have a theory of what 
cognition involves.  In brief, we think involves non-derived 
representations covered by ceteris paribus psychological laws".  
 
I hope that the Hippo-world example, developed in the present text, will go 
some way towards making us uneasy about such appeals to the current state of 
knowledge. Interestingly, in the same personal communication, Aizawa is clear 
that "future scientific developments could undermine our theory and force 
revisions". Perhaps, then, the jury simply remains out until scientific theorizing 
proves or disproves the value of looking at larger systemic wholes involving 
biological and non-biological resources. 
 
vii Note that this is a much broader notion than that of the conscious, which may 
be individuated in ways that appeal to much more than characteristic effects or 
(what comes to the same thing) characteristic kinds of functional poise. 
 
 36 
                                                                                                                                                 
viii
 Given some sufficiently complex web of other beliefs and desires. 
 
ix See also Rupert (2004) 
 
x For a useful survey, see Mundale (2001), and for more discussion, Mundale 
(2002) 
 
xi See Clark (2003) (In Press) 
 
xii This worry also seems to be at work in Rupert (2004) (this volume). 
 
xiii For some clear and compelling expositions of this kind of view, see Sutton 
(this volume), Wilson (this volume). 
 
xiv Unless the additional resource is another biological agent of course! 
